Dealing with drought in irrigated agriculture through insurance schemes: an application to an irrigation district in Southern Spain by Ruiz, Jorge et al.
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research
13(4), e0106, 15 pages (2015)
eISSN: 2171-9292 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5424/sjar/2015134-6941
Instituto Nacional de Investigación y Tecnología Agraria y Alimentaria (INIA)
RESEARCH ARTICLE OPEN ACCESS
Dealing with drought in irrigated agriculture through insurance 
schemes: an application to an irrigation district in Southern Spain
Jorge Ruiz, Maria Bielza, Alberto Garrido and Ana Iglesias
Research Centre for the Management of Agricultural and Environmental Risks (CEIGRAM), Technical University of Madrid (UPM), Spain.
Abstract
Hydrological drought is expected to have an increasing impact on both crop and fruit yields in arid and semi-arid regions. 
Some existing crop insurance schemes provide coverage against water deficits in rain-fed agriculture. The Prevented Planting 
Program in the USA covers against drought for irrigated agriculture. However, drought insurance for irrigated agriculture is still 
a challenge for companies and institutions because of the complexity of the design and implementation of this type of insurance. 
Few studies have attempted to evaluate the risk of loss due to irrigation water scarcity using both stand-alone production func-
tions and crop simulation models. This paper’s contributions are that it evaluates the suitability of AquaCrop for calculating 
drought insurance premiums for irrigated agriculture and that it discusses contract conditions and insurance design for hydro-
logical drought risk coverage as part of a traditional insurance product, with on-field loss assessment in combination with a 
trigger index. This method was applied to an irrigation district in southern Spain. Our insurance premium calculation showed 
that it is feasible to apply this method provided that its data requirements are met, such as a large enough set of reliable small-
scale yield and irrigation time series data, especially soil data, to calibrate AquaCrop. The choice of a trigger index should not 
be underestimated because it proved to have a decisive influence on insurance premiums and indemnities. Our discussion of the 
contract conditions shows that hydrological drought insurance must comply with a series of constraints in order to avoid moral 
hazard and basis risk.
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Introduction
Drought-induced water scarcity is a recurring issue 
in some regions of the world. During drought periods, 
farmers resort to different management strategies, 
mostly aimed at increasing the amount of water avail-
able to crops: development of terraces, soil bunds or 
small catchments; mitigation of evaporation through 
crop residue management, intercropping and cover 
cropping; construction of water storage structures rang-
ing from farm ponds to dams (Rockström, 2003). 
However, water harvesting and irrigation are not always 
a definitive solution because drought sometimes affects 
irrigated agriculture, too. Hydrological drought is an 
event that inflicts significant losses on farmers. Its ef-
fects are potentially exacerbated by water managers 
over-allocating water to irrigators in years of plenty 
(Iglesias et al., 2003). Moreover, it is predicted that 
climate change may aggravate water scarcity and 
drought events in some regions by changing the fre-
quency, intensity and distribution of precipitation 
(IPCC, 2012). 
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stractions and, if strictly adhered to, eliminate discre-
tionary management decisions as well.
In spite of the complexity of insuring drought in 
irrigated agriculture, researchers are studying this issue. 
For some time now, in addition to the Prevented Plant-
ing Program, the USA has been trying to develop a 
methodology to implement successfully an insurance 
contract option for irrigated agriculture. This method-
ology attempts to cover farmers who, due to the lack 
of water, are obliged to apply limited irrigation to their 
crops (corn and soybean). It is based on yield adjust-
ment tables calculated by the University of Nebraska 
on the basis of limited irrigation, but an agreement has 
not been reached with producers on the proposed yield 
tables (Waechter, 2012). 
Other authors have estimated the potential cost of 
hydrological drought insurance. Quiroga et al. (2011) 
have estimated farmers’ willingness to pay for hypo-
thetical hydrological drought insurance for maize in 
the Ebro River Basin of Spain. Pérez & Gómez (2012, 
2014) have calculated pure premiums of hydrological 
drought insurance for ligneous crops2 in southern Spain 
(La Campiña, Guadalquivir) and in south-eastern Spain 
(Campo de Cartagena, Segura). 
The main objective of this study was to estimate 
the cost of hydrological drought insurance for irri-
gated arable crops. We tested a developed methodol-
ogy by comparing premiums estimated from 
AquaCrop simulated yields with premiums estimated 
from actual yield data provided by an irrigation dis-
trict (ID). Based on data availability, we selected the 
Genil-Cabra ID in the Guadalquivir River Basin 
(southern Spain). While some existing studies have 
estimated the cost of hydrological drought insurance 
for irrigated agriculture, none has offered a compre-
hensive discussion of insurance design and contract 
conditions. Thus, a second objective of this paper was 
to look at the cost of commercial premiums and dis-
cuss product design and contract conditions. 
Material and methods
Insurance design and contract conditions
During the design of an insurance product, insurance 
companies usually have to set some contractual condi-
A tool with the potential for dealing with this im-
portant risk is crop insurance. Despite the fact that 
several experts consider crop insurance an inefficient 
management tool (Glauber & Joseph, 2013; Wright, 
2014), it has expanded in recent years into many de-
veloped and developing countries (Bielza et al., 2008). 
Meteorological drought risk has traditionally been 
considered as a non-insurable risk because of its sys-
temic character, which means that large losses are 
registered contemporaneously over vast areas (Pérez 
& Gómez, 2014). Nevertheless, rainfed crops have 
recently been covered against drought by private insur-
ance, owing to public sector support (e.g., Spain, Aus-
tria, Canada and the USA) (Bielza et al., 2008).
On the contrary, existing agricultural insurance 
typically does not provide coverage against hydro-
logical drought in irrigated agriculture (Maestro & 
Bielza, 2011; Pérez & Gómez, 2014). In the USA 
drought is covered by the Multiple Peril Insurance 
Coverage (MPCI) program. The program covers against 
damage caused by natural hazards including drought. 
In the case of irrigation, if farmers expect to receive 
less water than their usual allotment before coverage 
begins, they often decrease planted acreage under ir-
rigation. The remainder of their acres can either be 
planted but reported as non-irrigated, or not planted 
and compensated for under the Prevented Planting 
Program1 (Rejesus et al., 2003; RMA-Topeka, 2013). 
Pérez & Gómez (2012) mention two main problems 
with insurance coverage for hydrological drought risks 
in irrigated agriculture: (1) institutional decisions 
about water availability are very tentative, and (2) 
insurance generally costs much more than the alterna-
tive of illegal abstractions. Whereas the second prob-
lem varies from one case to another depending on 
groundwater availability, the first issue can be con-
sidered as the main reason why there are still so few 
drought insurance products for irrigated agriculture. 
The possibility of managing and redistributing water 
stocks means that hydrological drought is not a 
purely random risk. These problems could be solved 
if strict rules were applied to water stock allocation. 
Pérez & Gómez (2012) mention that if the Mediter-
ranean countries of the European Union (EU) would 
enforce existing rules established in river basin man-
agement plans and drought management plans 
(DMPs), they would increase the cost of illegal ab-
1 The prevented planting provision is a standard element of crop insurance contracts offered by the Risk Management Agency 
(RMA) of the USA. This provision allows an insured producer to receive an indemnity payment if, due to a valid cause of loss 
(including drought), the producer fails to plant an insured crop before a designated planting date. The cause of loss must be ‘general’ 
in the surrounding area and must have prevented similar producers in the area from planting their crops. [US-GAO, 1999; USDA/
OIG, 1999].
2 Fruit trees including citrus, olive trees and grapevine in La Campiña; fruit trees including citrus, almond trees and grapevine in 
Campo de Cartagena.
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a combination of an index-based and traditional insur-
ance scheme, where an index value triggers the right 
to file a claim, but indemnities are calculated from 
actual farm losses directly observed during on-field 
loss assessments (C2). Therefore, in the proposed meth-
odology, the use of the drought index differs from index 
insurances where the indemnity or compensation 
amount is directly estimated from the index value. In 
our case the index just determines if there is a drought 
but not its intensity. On-field loss assessment has the 
additional advantage that it is deeply rooted in Spain 
and in general in the Mediterranean European countries 
despite the fact that it increases administrative costs 
significantly (Hyde & Vercammen, 1997; Wright, 
2014). Thus farmers and Spanish insurance companies 
are used to it.
Regarding water redistribution between crops, in 
the case of water shortage, economists would expect 
farmers to allocate all the available water to certain 
crops and not to others in such a way that they mini-
mize economic losses. If insurance was crop-specific, 
this behavior would lead to adverse selection (i.e., 
farmers might insure only crops that typically receive 
less water) and moral hazard (i.e., reallocating all 
water to non-insured crops). This means that crop-
specific insurance with traditional on-field loss as-
sessment is not an option for hydrological drought. It 
is only viable for farms that grow only one crop. 
Otherwise all crops on a farm should be insured. 
Given that whole-farm insurance has been shown to 
be more efficient than the sum of crop-specific insur-
tions to avoid asymmetric information problems, but 
additional circumstances need to be taken into account 
in the case of hydrological drought. Each of these con-
tractual conditions (C1 to C10) are explained below 
and summarized in Table 1.
Farmers can typically manage water stocks by 
either selling them to a neighbor or redistributing 
them between crops. We analyzed the implications 
of these two possibilities. The option of selling water 
to a fellow farmer could cause severe moral hazard, 
because a farmer who buys insurance will have an 
incentive to sell the water to a non-insured farmer 
and claim an indemnity. Thus, one condition for 
farmers to be eligible for insurance should be that 
the irrigation system infrastructure prohibits or 
monitors these transactions by some control mecha-
nism, such as water meters. 
In any case, irrigation districts should inform insur-
ance companies of the water supplied to all farmers 
(C1). If this is not possible, only index insurance 
(which depends on an index value rather than actual 
farm yields) would be viable. This is why many authors 
have proposed index insurance against drought in ir-
rigated agriculture3. Index insurance has a lot of poten-
tial because it avoids moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion problems. Under non-homogeneous farming 
conditions, however, it can fail due to low correlation 
between the index and actual farm losses, which results 
in a high ‘basis risk’. Bielza et al. (2012) have shown 
that indexes are not closely correlated to the relevant 
risks in some areas of Spain. This is why we propose 
3  Leiva & Skees (2008) have proposed irrigation insurance based on a river flow index in Mexico. Zeuli & Skees (2005) proposed 
a rainfall index as a tool for improving drought management in Australia. 
Table 1. Insurance design and main characteristics of the insurance contract
Characteristic Description
C1. Farm eligibility For a farm to be insurable, farm water allotment information should be 
supplied to the insurer by the ID managers and non-monitored water 
transfers between farms should not be technically possible
C2. Loss assessment: on field- vs. index On-field loss adjustment
C3. Crop-specific vs. whole-farm insurance Whole-farm insurance: it is compulsory to insure all crops on the farm and it 
is limited to farms with eligible crops only
C4. Guarantee or insured value Historical-average crop production value of the insured farm
C5. Trigger-index Potential use of status indicators from drought management plans, where 
indicator and water allotment must be correlated
C6. Coverage 50-100% coverage of guarantee or insured value
C7. Deductibles Franchise deductible of 5% of guarantee or insured value
C8. Purchase period Before the rainy season
C9. Duration of the contract In case of inertial systems, a multiannual contract 
C10. Limitation on insurable crop surface mix The sum of each crop surface multiplied by the average historical water 
allocation to each crop cannot exceed the farmer’s water rights
ID: Irrigation District.
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ance; however, that insurance “shall only be avail-
able where the occurrence of an adverse climatic 
event or the outbreak of an animal or plant disease 
or pest infestation has been formally recognized as 
such by the competent authority of the Member State 
concerned. Member States may, where appropriate, 
establish in advance criteria on the basis of which 
such formal recognition shall be deemed to be 
granted”. One criterion that could be established to 
officially categorize a drought as a natural disaster 
is that a public drought index reaches a specific trig-
ger value. Therefore a valid drought index should be 
public, easy to understand, transparent and impos-
sible to manipulate.
Other contract conditions attempt to avoid potential 
problems of moral hazard or adverse selection. This is 
the case for enforcing a deductible. We suggest that the 
insurance contract should at least include a small fran-
chise deductible4 equaling for example 5% of the in-
sured amount (C7). This means that losses will only be 
considered when they are higher than 5% of the insured 
amount. The reason is that it is not worthwhile to claim 
losses under that level for either the insurance com-
pany, which has to incur the cost of the loss assessment 
for a relatively small loss, or the farmer, who according 
to the Spanish insurance regulation has to keep not less 
than a 5% sample surface unharvested to allow for loss 
adjustment (BOE, 1996).
Given that hydrological drought can usually be 
foreseen at the time spring-planted crops are sown, 
farmers might buy insurance only when a drought is 
expected, generating adverse selection. For this rea-
son, the purchase period for insurance should be be-
fore the rainy (or snowfall) season (C8). In some areas 
with a large reservoir capacity, hydrological drought 
can be foreseen months before the start of the rainy 
season (inertial systems). This encourages farmers to 
buy insurance only when a dry season is expected. To 
avoid this risk, we proposed offering farmers a multi-
annual contract whereby they would be committed to 
buy insurance for a certain number of years, and the 
premium would be modified every year according to 
the yearly farm crop surface distribution (C9). Ad-
ditionally, to avoid that a farmer purposely shifts his 
crop mix towards crops that are both more valuable 
and water demanding in order to increase the probabil-
ity and value of an indemnity, the maximum insurable 
surface of each crop must be limited by farmer water 
rights (C10). It must not be feasible to insure a crop 
surface mix that multiplied by the crops historical 
ance (Bielza & Garrido, 2009), the insurance premium 
rates should be personalized according to the percent-
age of each eligible crop present on the farm. This 
implies, however, that a farm can only be insured 
when it grows only insurable crops (i.e., crops whose 
drought risk can be calculated by the insurer) (C3). 
This constraint could potentially discourage farmers 
from trying new crops within their rotation, as an 
adaptation to climate change.
The insurance product’s guarantee should be the 
farm production value, calculated as the weighted 
average of crop production value. This is obtained 
from all available past crop yields multiplied by a 
fixed crop price; therefore, it will not cover price or 
market risks. Premium rates will depend on the his-
torical variability of farm yields due to a shortage of 
irrigation water (C4).
Loss adjusters should single out the loss caused by 
drought from the losses caused by other factors. How-
ever, this might not always be evident. To increase 
the certainty that a loss is caused by drought, insur-
ance indemnities would be linked to a drought index 
that acts as a trigger in years of water shortage (C5). 
Only when the indicator value falls below a trigger 
value (specifically chosen to correspond to a drought 
situation for each farmer or ID) are farmers entitled 
to file a claim to the insurance company. The insur-
ance company will then send an independent expert 
to evaluate the losses and establish an indemnity if 
applicable (this step differentiates our insurance 
scheme from strictly index-based schemes, which do 
not involve a loss adjustment process). Combined, the 
drought index and on-field loss adjustment reduce 
moral hazard associated with insured farmers attribut-
ing losses to water shortages when losses are due to 
other reasons.
Another advantage of establishing this drought 
index (with a trigger value) is that it assures the 
scheme is compliant with EU legislation and with 
the World Trade Organization (WTO, 1995) green 
box condition for subsidies to crop insurance. Spe-
cifically, the 2006 EU Regulation (EU, 2006) has 
one necessary condition for state subsidies to agri-
cultural insurance to be exempt from the notification 
requirement: the climatic event causing a loss should 
be attributable to a natural disaster and must be for-
mally recognized as such by public authorities. 
Similarly, the 2009 Regulation of the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) (EU, 2009) allows EU 
CAP funds to be used for crop/animal/plant insur-
4 Franchise deductible is a minimum amount of loss that must be incurred before insurance coverage applies. A franchise deductible 
differs from an ordinary deductible in that, once it is met, the entire amount of the loss is paid, subject to the policy limit (IRMI, 
2014).
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revenue— to different variables, including irrigation 
water allocation. For example, Quiroga et al. (2011) 
have statistically estimated a crop production function 
for maize yield response to various bio-physical and 
socio-economic explanatory variables. Pérez & Gómez 
(2012, 2014) used agronomic production functions for 
ligneous trees that are based on the percentage of 
evaporation satisfied. 
One challenge to modeling the impact of hydrological 
drought on crop yields is data. Quiroga et al. (2011) use 
provincial data to calibrate their model. From our point 
of view, a province, which includes land belonging to 
different irrigation districts or different watersheds, is 
too large and heterogeneous a surface area. Smaller-scale 
data should be used to properly estimate the impact of 
irrigation water on crop yields. Agronomic production 
functions, such as those used by Pérez & Gómez (2012, 
2014), are potentially a good alternative but they are not 
always easy to find for a particular site. When unavail-
able, production functions from other regions have been 
modified to fit yields characteristic of the case study area 
(assuring that they maintain their elasticity and mar-
ginal productivity properties). But it has not been veri-
fied that yield response to water is the same across re-
gions. Moreover, we have observed that these models 
have sometimes been calibrated only for a specific range 
of water allocations and are not suitable for out-of-
sample values. 
We proposed an alternative method, which is the use 
of a crop growth simulation model. Only aggregate 
(provincial) yield data are available in Spain, so crop 
production is calculated from a set of daily climatic 
and irrigation parameters used as input to the FAO’s 
AquaCrop model (Heng et al., 2009; Hsiao et al., 2009; 
Raes et al., 2009; Steduto et al., 2009). AquaCrop was 
chosen because yields depend not only on the water 
they receive, but also precipitation and local conditions, 
such as weather, soil, crop variety and agronomic tech-
niques.
Yields simulated with AquaCrop take into consid-
eration only differences in water application and 
weather variability, whereas actual yields obtained by 
farmers may have suffered from other eventualities like 
disease or pests. We therefore calculated insurance 
premiums from actual yields provided by the ID in 
order to validate the yields and premiums calculated 
using AquaCrop. We also conditioned the indemnities 
on the existence of a drought episode, as identified by 
a drought indicator, to limit yield variability to that 
caused by hydrological drought. 
Pure premium rates were calculated for individual 
crops and also for an average farm, with the same crop 
distribution as that typically observed in the ID (re-
ferred to as ID/whole-farm insurance). ID/whole-farm 
average water allocation is above the water rights of 
the farmer. 
Finally, another situation specific to hydrological 
drought insurance is the possibility of a farmer who, 
having bought insurance at the beginning of the crop 
season (fall time) for a specified planted crop acreage, 
faces at spring time a drought that is more severe than 
expected. Often, the farmer still has the option, during 
the spring, to plant different crops to minimize their 
losses. In this case, the farmer will have to inform the 
insurance company of changes in crop surface areas 
(and therefore, the insurance premium should be recti-
fied in this second period), and indemnities will have 
to be paid based on the success or failure of the new 
crop surface areas. This is not a fair solution, espe-
cially if the new surface areas are dominated by fallow 
land where the farmer would not receive any compen-
sation. In this point the prevented planting program 
used in the USA could be applied if there is forecasted 
an extremely severe drought that could prevent crop 
success. 
Calculation of pure premium rates
The estimation of pure (actuarially fair) hydrological 
drought insurance premiums involves two main steps: 
(i) quantifying the risk associated with irrigation water 
allocations received by farmers, and (ii) quantifying 
the impact of water allocations on farmers’ revenue or 
income. 
Pérez & Gómez (2014) quantify the risk associated 
with irrigation water allocation by taking an approach 
similar to index insurance. They estimate water deliv-
ered to farmers from two stochastic variables (water 
stored in reservoirs and annual runoff), which is then 
combined with decision rules used by reservoir water 
authorities. In practice, however, these rules are not 
always followed. In the future, however, water alloca-
tion rules should be strictly adhered to if insurance is 
to be feasible. Quiroga et al. (2011) used the Water 
Availability and Policy Analysis (WAPA) model to 
simulate the joint operation of all reservoirs in a basin 
to satisfy a set of demands. We propose to simply quan-
tify the risk associated with irrigation water allocation 
directly from historical values of water allocation to 
each crop, which are annually reported by the IDs to 
the river basin hydrographic confederations. These 
water allocation data can be used for risk calculation 
only if they have not been distorted to get insurance 
payments. 
Impact of water allocation on farmers’ revenue dur-
ing a shortage is often quantified using stochastic 
models that relate crop yields —and indirectly, farm 
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by a number of factors to account for uncertainty about 
the estimated indemnity, administrative and operating 
(A&O) expenses, loss-adjustment costs, and profit for 
the insurance company (Agroseguro, 2003; Smith & 
Watts, 2009). Based on data from a wide review of 
agricultural insurance systems in several European 
countries, Bielza et al. (2008) suggested that the ratio 
of the pure premium to the commercial premium is 
approximately 70%5. According to Agroseguro (2003), 
the commercial premium equals the pure premium 
multiplied by 1.406. Given these two values are almost 
equal, we multiplied our pure premiums by 1.4 to ob-
tain commercial premiums. 
For comparison purposes, actual commercial premi-
ums charged by insurance companies in the study area 
have been obtained from Agroseguro (2013). However, 
these ‘real’ commercial premiums are for multi-risk 
crop insurance, covering irrigated crops against all 
natural hazards whose effects are verifiable and meas-
urable (such as hail, fire, wildlife or excess rainfall), 
but not drought. 
Application to the Santaella Irrigation 
District (Genil-Cabra, Guadalquivir)
Our case-study is the Santaella ID (Colectividad de 
Santaella), located in the Guadalquivir River Basin in 
the Andalusian province of Córdoba (southern Spain). 
This ID is a part of the Genil-Cabra Irrigation System 
(Zona Regable del Genil Cabra). This system is fed 
mainly by the Iznájar and the Cordobilla dams through 
the Genil-Cabra channel, which has a mean flow rate 
of 40 m3/s. Water supplied by the channel is mostly 
used for irrigation; only 1% of it is allocated to indus-
trial uses. The Genil-Cabra Irrigation System is man-
aged as part of the larger General Guadalquivir River 
Basin System (GGRBS), between which water ex-
changes take place according to needs. There is no 
irrigation from underground water in Santaella ID.
Indexes with the desirable characteristics for index 
insurance (being public, easy to understand, transparent 
and impossible to manipulate) have been used in recent 
years to officially indicate different drought levels in 
all of the Spanish river basins. They are called Indices 
de Estado (status indicators) and were published by the 
river basin hydrographic confederations in the 2007 
special plans of action in drought warning and potential 
drought situations (EC, 2007; Estrela & Vargas, 2012). 
These plans of action define the “status indicators”, 
which are calculated from reservoir stock levels, in-
insurance pure premiums are calculated according to 
Eq. [1]:
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where PR is the premium rate (as a percentage), R is the 
farm’s average crop revenue (ha–1), n is the number of 
years, Rt is the insured value of a farm’s crop production 
(ha–1) in year t, rt is the farm’s actual average crop rev-
enue (ha–1) in year t, FD is the franchise deductible, it is 
the drought index in year t, ITr is the drought index trig-
ger level, C is the coverage level, k is the number of 
crops on the farm, Pc is the average crop price for crop 
c in the studied time series, Sct is the surface area of crop 
c in year t, Y c is the average yield for crop c, yct is the 
actual yield for crop c in year t. If a significant trend was 
observed for yields, we detrended it before taking the 
average to isolate natural variability in yield from 
technology-driven changes in yield.
When the farm only has one crop, crop-specific 
insurance is possible, and premiums are also calcu-
lated according to Eq. [1], where k=1, = ×R P Yt c c , and 
= ×r P yt c ct .
Commercial premiums
Commercial premiums are calculated by increasing 
pure or actuarially fair premiums through multiplication 
5 The ratio of pure premium to commercial premium can be assimilated to the long-term loss ratio or ratio of average indemnities 
to average premiums.
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olive tree (IFAPA, 2009). The main agronomic parameters 
needed to define yield simulations in AquaCrop are: the 
most common crop varieties, crop life-cycle reference 
dates, and planting density. All of these parameters were 
obtained from García-Vila & Fereres (2012) for all crops, 
except wheat, which were not available. Wheat was 
simulated using AquaCrop’s default parameters. The 
simulated sunflower yields were too high with respect to 
actual yields, so fertilization was adjusted to 50% of po-
tential need. In fact, there is a tendency to under-fertilize 
sunflowers with NPK in the south of Spain, partly because 
of the crop’s capacity to absorb residual fertilizers from 
deep soil layers (Urbano, 2010). Another issue possibly 
influencing under-fertilization of sunflower in the region 
is that the crop has lower water use efficiency (WUE) 
than maize. At the same time, sunflower is not very sen-
sitive to water scarcity; its WUE is more adaptive in re-
sponse to available moisture (Green & Read, 1983). 
Therefore, it is one of the first crops to suffer water con-
straints in favor of more profitable crops. 
Olive tree is one of the most important crops in the 
Genil-Cabra ID (36.6% of total crop area in 2012). In 
view of its importance, and because AquaCrop is un-
able to simulate ligneous crops, a crop production 
function was used instead. In this function, final yield 
depends solely on the annual amount of water received 
by the tree, taking into account both rainfall and irriga-
tion. The following explicit production function was 
validated for the neighboring province of Jaén with a 
R2 =0.72 (Pastor et al., 2002).
 = − + −Y x x5477.8 30.8 0.01 2  [2]
where Y is the yield (kg/ha) and x is the amount of water 
applied to the tree via rainfall and irrigation (mm).
Weather variables collected for AquaCrop simula-
tions included precipitation, potential evapotranspira-
tion (ETO), and temperature from 1999 to 2012. These 
data were sourced from the Agriculture and Fisheries 
Research and Training Institute, of the Andalusian 
Regional Government Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and the Environment.
Soil characteristics such as type, depth and under-
ground water salinity were also included in AquaCrop 
simulations. Average soil type was taken from Coelho 
et al. (2000); it is classified – according to the FAO 
classification system (FitzPatrick, 1980) – as sandy 
loam Typic Xerofluvent (USDA, 1975) or Eutric Flu-
visol soil. It imposes clear constraints on root growth 
at depths of 3 m. Irrigation water salinity was cali-
brated according to Rodriguez (2005), who found an 
average salinity close to 2 dS/m in the Santaella ID.
Irrigation water is supplied to the Santaella ID by a 
modern pressurized irrigation-delivery system, which 
flows and, in some cases, also from groundwater levels. 
The plans also establish thresholds defining the sys-
tem’s drought status (normal, watch, warning and 
emergency). These indicators and thresholds are often 
taken into account by ID water managers when they 
determine water allotments. So, these indicators can 
be used as a trigger index, provided that they are 
positively correlated with the water allotments given 
to farmers.
In our study area, April is the month that best rep-
resents the upcoming irrigation season (CHG, 2007), 
so the GGRBS April Status Indicator (ASI) is a poten-
tial candidate to be used as a trigger index it for our 
insurance scheme. This indicator is based on GGRBS 
water reservoir stocks at the end of April and is used 
by water management authorities to determine water 
allocations. Even though the status indicators have 
shown a good correlation with water allocations in 
other Spanish river basins (e.g., Bardenas in the Ebro 
River Basin), we found that the correlation was surpris-
ingly low for Genil-Cabra. We chose it anyway because 
it is the indicator that behaves better among other avail-
able indicators (we also tried the Standardized Pre-
cipitation Index, water inflows, and different combina-
tions of water inflows with previous year stocks in the 
GGRBS reservoir system and in the Iznajar-Cordobil-
la reservoirs). Moreover, we have certainty that when 
it indicates a drought, water allocations suffer cuts (to 
a greater or lesser extent) because water authorities use 
it as a reference to determine annual allocations. The 
ASI takes values between 0 (no water available in 
reservoirs) and 1 (full water availability). For ASI 
below 0.5 the water authorities consider the system in 
warning status and water allocations may be cut back. 
Therefore, we set the trigger level at =0.5. Thus, when-
ever ASI is below 0.5, the status for the crop season is 
considered to be drought.
The selected coverage level is 100%; this enables us 
to capture the whole risk in the premium. However, the 
more common 70% coverage is also used to compare 
our calculated commercial premiums (for drought) with 
real commercial premiums for an existing multi-risk 
insurance product. 
The crop season in Santaella ID starts in November 
with the sowing of winter cereals. The rainy season 
occurs from October to April. Therefore the insurance 
purchase period could be October-November at the 
latest, to prevent adverse selection. Looking at the cor-
relation coefficient between the ASI and the previous 
year’s October Status Indicator (cc=0.8, p=0.00), we 
can deduce that this case-study represents an inertial 
system, thus requiring a multiannual contract. 
We analyzed crops with the largest irrigated surface 
area in Santaella ID: wheat, maize, sunflower, cotton, and 
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Results
Yield simulations
AquaCrop simulations were carried out for the pe-
riod 2000-01 to 2011-12, except for the 2008-09 season 
because irrigation data were not available for it. Table 
3 shows average yields (ha–1) and coefficients of vari-
ation (CV) for simulated vs actual crop data (as re-
ported by the ID), along with provincial yields for 
reference purposes. Average simulated yields are 
slightly higher than reported yields (except for maize) 
but are very close on the whole to both reported and 
provincial yields. The difference is due to the diffi-
culty of calibrating AquaCrop without on-field agro-
nomic data. Specifically, it might be due to an overes-
timation of the irrigation system efficiency. 
Analysis of the CV shows that simulated yields are 
consistently less variable than reported yields, except 
for olive trees. A possible explanation for this lower 
variation in Aquacrop simulated yields is that actual 
yields depend on more factors, such as surface use 
changes (including soil quality changes) and a number 
of perils other than drought. Figure 2 shows the influence 
of surface area on per hectare yields. When maize area 
increases, its average yield decreases and vice versa. 
Other crops did not show this effect, suggesting that 
better quality soils are always assigned to maize. While 
there is a high correlation between simulated and actual 
reported wheat yields, the correlation of sunflower and 
cotton is much lower. Actual reported sunflower yields 
(ha–1) decreased sizably in the 2004-07 period, which is 
consistent with a shrinkage in sunflower surface area, 
thereby suggesting that poorer quality soils were as-
signed to this crop. Cotton followed a particular trend, 
reflected in surface area and in reported yields, as a 
allows farmers to irrigate on demand with variable 
frequency, rate and duration. Sprinkler irrigation ac-
counts for 60% of the area; the remaining 40% is under 
drip irrigation. Yields were simulated for each water 
application method, and subsequently weighted accord-
ing to the area under each irrigation method. Data re-
garding irrigation was sourced from the Santaella ID 
annual reports, which record the annual amount of water 
allocated to each crop and the amount of water em-
ployed monthly throughout the whole district. These 
data were used to estimate the distribution of actual 
irrigation events for each season and each crop, taking 
into account different crop calendars. Irrigation records 
cover the 2000-12 period, excluding the year 2009, 
when no reports were published by the ID. Figure 1 
shows the annual volume of water applied in the entire 
ID in each irrigation season (from April to September), 
and the average volume of water applied per hectare on 
the secondary axis. All parameters and variables used 
to calibrate AquaCrop for the Santaella ID’s agronom-
ic and climatic conditions are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Parameters used in AquaCrop to define the Santaella Irrigation District.
Variable Units Sources
Weather Precipitation mm IFAPA (1999-2012)
Temperature °C
ET0 mm
Soil and underground 
water
Depth cm Coelho et al. (2000)
Texture USDA
Soil salinity dS/m
Underground water salinity dS/m Rodriguez (2005) 
Crop Variety Species IFAPA (2009)
Crop cycle reference dates Date Garcia-Vila & Fereres (2012)
Seeding rate Plants/m2
Weight of 1000 grain seed g
Yield ton/ha ID Annual Reports1
Irrigation Annual water allocation per crop hm3 ID Annual Reports1
1 Unpublished. ID: Irrigation District.
Figure 1. Santaella ID total irrigation water application.
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Table 4 (which uses AquaCrop yields) and Table 5 
(which uses actual reported yields). Both tables show 
the guaranteed yield (in kg/ha and €/ha), the premium 
amounts (in €/ha), and the premium rates (as a percent-
age of the guaranteed yield).
Comparing the premiums calculated from AquaCrop 
and ID reported yields, we found that AquaCrop premi-
ums were smaller than ID-Report premiums, except for 
cotton. Another result from this comparison is that the 
ID premium was smaller than the premium for the area-
weighted average of crop-specific insurance, due to risk 
management done by farmers. Farmers maximize their 
net income by shifting their crops’ acreage distribution 
according to water availability, an effect that disappears 
when only average surfaces were considered. 
Olive tree has been excluded from the ID/whole-farm 
insurance because, as Figure 2 and Table 3 show, yields 
simulated using the production function differ signifi-
consequence of the 2005 changes in CAP subsidies 
(introduction of the single payment scheme), which 
decreased its profitability notably. Maize yields are 
relatively constant, although its area is constantly shift-
ing. This is explained by the preference for allocating 
the best soil and consistent water to this crop. 
Correlation coefficients between simulated and re-
ported yields, between yields and the drought index, 
between the drought index and water allocation, and 
between water allocation and surface areas are shown 
in Table S1 [online supplement].
Pure premium rates
The pure (actuarially fair) premiums, calculated for 
various arable crops on a representative Santaella ID 
farm, assuming a 100% coverage level, are reported in 
 

 

Figure 2. Actual vs simulated yields (kg/ha), and actual district-wide crop area (ha).
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only takes into account the total annual water received by 
the tree, instead of daily climatic variables such as tem-
perature, rain and evapotranspiration, which have a crucial 
influence over yields. Hence the use of this production 
function generates inaccurate estimates of yields and 
consequently of insurance premiums.
Commercial premiums and comparison with 
2013 actual multi-risk commercial premiums
Commercial premiums for ID/whole-farm insur-
ance calculated from AquaCrop yields and from 
cantly from the actual yields taken from ID reports. 
Therefore, the comparison of olive’s simulated yields (by 
means of the production function) with AquaCrop yields 
could be misleading. Table 6 shows the guaranteed yields 
and premium rates for the crop-specific olive insurance, 
which were calculated from the production function and 
from reported yields. Premium rates were much higher 
using the production function than reported yields, which 
we expected due to the higher variability of production 
function yields (Table 3). Recall that the olive tree produc-
tion function was calculated for the neighboring province 
of Jaen, which does not have the same agronomic condi-
tions as the Santaella ID. The production function also 
Table 3. Comparison of crop yields average and coefficient of variation in Santaella ID.
Crop
Yield average (µ) (kg/ha) Yield coefficient of variation (σ/µ) (%)
Simulated ID-Reports Province1 Simulated ID-Reports Province1
Wheat  4,199  3,682  4,475 13.39 16.38  3.91
Maize 12,824 13,059 12,394  3.16  9.54  5.19
Sunflower  1,996  1,884  2,008  4.87 20.90 15.95
Cotton  3,350  2,960  2,852  9.00 26.69 36.93
Olive tree  6,835 2  7,744  5,206 25.65 2  6.62 12.26
1 Provincial yields are from annual Ministry reports (2000-2010). 2 Olive tree yield has been calculated from a production function by 
Pastor et al. (2002) instead of using AquaCrop.
Table 4. Insurance guarantee and pure premium for Santaella ID from AquaCrop yields.
Crop
Insured value Pure premium
(kg/ha) (€/ha) (€/ha) (%)
Wheat 5,539 1,008 19.76 1.96
Maize 12,824 2,448 12.46 0.51
Sunflower 1,997 637  4.83 0.76
Cotton1 3,350 1,965 63.12 3.21
Weighted average2 – 1,356 27.35 2.02
ID insurance – 1,357 16.07 1.18
1Simulated yields for cotton have been detrended (y = -38.439x + 2615.3; R² = 0.34).2 Weighted 
average calculates the premium (average indemnities) per crop and weights it on the average 
surface of each crop for the studied period. In contrast, ID insurance calculates indemnities for 
the combination of crops in the ID each year.
Table 5. Insurance guarantee and premium for Santaella ID from reported yields.
Crop
Insured value Pure premium
(kg/ha) (€/ha) (€/ha) (%)
Wheat 3,682 670 27.83 4.15
Maize 13,059 2,492 53.08 2.13
Sunflower 1,884 561 37.15 6.18
Cotton1 2,960 1,906 36.28 1.90
Weighted average – 1,181 34.41 2.91
ID insurance – 1,199 15.61 1.30
1Insured cotton yield has been adapted to the structural change observed in yields and area data. 
It was fixed at 2.138 kg/ha for the 2001-05 and 2010-12 periods and at 1.288 kg/ha for 2006-
08. Note that reported annual yields are identical during the latter period, in which the cotton 
growing area halved.
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research December 2015 • Volume 13 • Issue 4 • e0106
11Dealing with drought in irrigated agriculture through insurance schemes in Southern Spain
to a wider range of agronomic conditions. Looking at 
the commercial premium rates with 100% coverage, 
we found that ID-Report premiums were always 
higher than AquaCrop premiums, because the former 
reflect many other causes of yield variability, not just 
drought. 
Discussion
This study has some major limitations. First, when 
using AquaCrop for premium calculation it should 
be noted that, although the model performed satis-
factorily for maize in the non-water-stress treatments 
and mild stress conditions, it was less satisfactory in 
severe water-stress treatments, especially when stress 
occurs during senescence (Heng et al., 2009). This 
could cause a misleading premium estimate. Second, 
AquaCrop is unable to simulate ligneous and forage 
crops, which reduces its scope of application. This 
could be solved in the future by extending the soft-
ware to simulate additional crops. Our attempt at 
using a production function to overcome this limita-
tion has shown that it will only achieve accurate 
results if it faithfully represents the local crop-re-
sponse to water. Also, our empirical application was 
based on a relatively small data series. AquaCrop 
calibration is a key issue; it requires accurate data to 
define agronomic conditions. To estimate the impact 
of irrigation water on yields, more precise data on 
characteristics for the different soil types is needed. 
Finally, the drought index used (ASI) showed a poor 
correlation with water allocations and therefore with 
crop yields, which compromises the application of 
our methods to this particular case. Previous studies 
performed by the authors (Ruiz et al., 2013) showed 
better correlations between the Status indicators and 
water allotments in Bardenas ID in Saragossa, and 
in El Viar ID in Seville (Spain), which shows that 
reported yields are shown in Table 7, against Agrose-
guro multirisk commercial premiums (hereafter ‘real’ 
premiums). As Agroseguro insurance covers only 
70% of the guaranteed yield, ‘AquaCrop’ premiums 
and ‘ID-Report’ premiums have also been calculated 
for a 70% coverage level. The premium rates are 
expressed as a percentage of guaranteed yield, 
rather than in €/ha for the purpose of comparison, 
given that guaranteed yield is not equal for all three 
premium types. 
At 70% coverage, commercial premiums based on 
‘AquaCrop’ and ‘ID-Report’ are zero for most crops. 
Only wheat yields from ID-Report suffered losses 
above 30% of the average yield (once in eleven 
years). Given that most premium rates for 70% cov-
erage are equal to 0, they are also shown for 100% 
coverage (i.e., no deductible) in the right-hand col-
umns of Table 7. 
Comparing the 70% coverage commercial premium 
rates, we found that ‘real’ premiums were higher than 
AquaCrop premiums, the only exception was cotton 
(see footnote to the Table 5). This is expected because 
‘real’ premiums provide coverage for more risks than 
‘AquaCrop’. ‘ID-Report’ premiums theoretically 
provide coverage for the same risks as the real pre-
miums (possibly for even more risks, such as pests 
and diseases). Nonetheless, they were smaller (e.g., 
for maize, sunflower and cotton), perhaps because 
real premiums were calculated for the entire region 
where, in all probability, yields were more erratic due 
Table 7. Commercial premium rates (%) for Santaella ID.
Crop
70% coverage 100% coverage
Real 1 AquaCrop ID-Reports AquaCrop ID-Reports
Wheat 0.48 0.00 2.00 2.74 5.81
Maize 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.71 2.98
Sunflower 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.06 8.65
Cotton 0.77 0.00 0.00 4.50 2.66
Weighted average 0.55 0.00 0.53 2.82 4.08
ID / whole-farm ins – 0.00 0.00 1.66 1.82
1 Multi-risk commercial premiums, Module 1 (Module 1 contract covers against all insurable per-
ils; perils and indemnities are given for the whole farm instead of for each parcel), 70% coverage. 
Source: Agroseguro (2013). 2 Cotton premiums are highly affected by CAP subsidies, which make 
its yields extremely erratic along the studied period.
Table 6. Olive insurance guarantee and premium for San-
taella ID.
Crop production 
function ID-Reports
Insured value (kg/ha) 7,408 7,744
Insured value (€/ha) 3,688 3,903
Premium rates (%) 4.86 1.75
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ID-Reports are lower (1.75%), even though reported 
yields should be exposed to more risks than our simu-
lated yields.
Commercial premiums calculated with a 70% 
coverage level (the one currently used for multi-risk 
insurance in Spain) resulted in very low-cost insur-
ance in comparison with current multi-risk insurance 
premiums. This is due to an extremely low probabil-
ity of indemnity at this coverage level. Given that 
100% coverage increases the premium considerably, 
above the customary premium levels, we recommend 
coverage of between 70 and 100%, or the inclusion 
of coverage for hydrological drought within an es-
tablished insurance scheme, with an additional pre-
mium for its coverage. For the province of Córdoba, 
drought represented almost 24% of total indemnities 
for the period 2009-20116. Considering that as the 
equivalent percentage in premiums cost, it is reason-
able that Aquacrop premiums at 70% coverage level 
are equal to 0. 
To see if irrigated-maize producers would buy 
drought insurance, the calculated commercial premiums 
for maize (0.71% for simulated yields and 2.98% for 
reported yields) could potentially be compared with 
the willingness to pay calculated by Quiroga et al. 
(2011). Unfortunately, these willingness to pay esti-
mates – which range from 2% to 17% – were calcu-
lated for a different region, and apply only to climate 
change scenarios.
Regarding the implementation of hydrological 
drought insurance for irrigated agriculture, we proposed 
the use of on-field loss assessment. This not only has 
the potential to stabilize farmers’ welfare, but also 
reduce incentives for illegal groundwater abstractions, 
therefore promoting more sustainable aquifer manage-
ment. This is positive-externality specific to hydro-
logical drought insurance with on-field loss assessment. 
Index insurance, without on-field loss assessment (as 
proposed by Leiva & Skees, 2008; or Zeuli & Skees, 
2005), is much simpler to implement, but could lead 
to indemnity payments when crop production did not 
decrease, due to the use of groundwater. On the other 
side, on-field loss assessment might increase adminis-
trative costs. However, in the case of Spain, assessors 
already visit rainfed parcels when there is a drought 
event. It is very likely that if irrigated agriculture suf-
fers from drought, rainfed crops suffer it as well, and 
that both types of parcels are closely located. Therefore 
assessors would only have to visit some additional 
parcels, particularly since irrigated agriculture represent 
only the 13% of the total agricultural surface (MA-
GRAMA, 2010). 
this weakness is strongly dependent on the study 
area.
Despite these limitations, the paper proposes an easy 
to use method to estimate insurance premiums to cover 
irrigation water deficits: ‘a very complex and interest-
ing issue for future research’ (as described by Quiroga 
et al. (2011). The proposed method might be useful to 
simulate premiums under not extremely limited irriga-
tion conditions, since Aquacrop discriminates each crop 
stage and faithfully replicates actual production condi-
tions. This might be used in other studies of drought 
insurance to estimate yields on which insurance pre-
miums are based, provided that crop calibration be 
improved through field research. 
This paper also discusses insurance implementation 
and contract conditions, which theoretically would lead 
to insurance success. However, in practice, some of 
these contract conditions are not easy to implement. 
This is the case for strict delivery rules by water au-
thorities, which is a key factor to obtaining a higher 
correlation between the index and water allotments. 
There are also some barriers to the installation of water 
meters on each parcel, especially in not-well-developed 
irrigation districts. In modern districts, such as Com-
munity V in Los Riegos de Bardenas in Saragossa, 
Spain, this could be implemented easily provided that 
on each parcel there is only one crop. In this Irrigation 
District, the amount of irrigation water applied on each 
parcel is requested by farmers via ATMs (automated 
teller machines), which are set up for this purpose, or 
by internet or mobile phone. The amount of water ap-
plied to each parcel is recorded automatically on the 
system’s server.
Additional insights were gained by comparing our 
simulated crop yields to actual data reported by an 
ID, and simulated vs actual commercial premiums 
from a multi-risk insurance product. According to 
our results, AquaCrop premiums were mostly small-
er than rates calculated from ID reports. AquaCrop 
yields depend mainly on the amount of water applied 
to the crop, whereas actual ID yields depend on more 
factors. Hence, ID-Report premiums included ad-
ditional risks that could affect crop production, such 
as fire, pest damage, disease, hail or flooding, or 
even the effects of market and agricultural policy 
changes. 
Our premium results can also be compared with 
those for olive trees by Pérez & Gómez (2012), who 
obtained a premium rate of 2.45% for this crop using 
a production function. Our production function gener-
ated some extreme and erratic values, resulting in a 
much higher premium of 4.86%. Premium rates from 
6 Agroseguro, 2009-2011. El seguro agrario combinado en cifras. Available at http://agroseguro.es/publicaciones/otras-publicaciones.
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One of the advantages of insurance with on-field 
assessment is that it is not strictly dependent on a 
good correlation between farm production and an 
index. However, we agree with Pérez & Gómez 
(2012) that drought insurance should be associated 
with a trigger-value of a drought index (mainly to 
partially avoid the high moral hazard associated to 
this type of coverage). The index should be transpar-
ent and objective to avoid moral hazard problems 
and to ensure it is largely outside the control of the 
primary insurer (Doherty & Richter, 2002). The suc-
cess of this type of hydrological drought insurance 
would require a good correlation between the index 
and crop yields, while at the same time strictly ad-
hering to clear water delivery rules. As suggested by 
Pérez & Gómez (2012), when the annual amount of 
water to be delivered does not conform to strict rules, 
the establishment of drought insurance in irrigated 
agriculture may not be feasible.
To avoid asymmetric information problems, which 
could compromise insurance viability (Pauly, 1974), 
the insurance contract should include, in addition to 
standard contract conditions such as deductibles, a 
series of commitments specific to this kind of insur-
ance, such as: provision of information about water 
allotments by the ID to the insurance company; use 
of water meters for each farm, or infeasibility of 
water exchanges between farms; compulsory pur-
chase of whole-farm insurance covering all crops on 
the farm and limitation of insurance to farms with 
only eligible (insurable) crops; a fixed purchase 
deadline before the rainy season; and multiannual 
contracts in the case of inertial systems. This is the 
case in most irrigation systems in southern Spain, 
where the reservoir capacity is large relative to an-
nual inflow. In northern Spain, though, reservoir 
stocks are annually renewed. A further contract 
condition is that farmers have no access to ground-
water. 
Further research should address the insurability of 
farms with groundwater availability. They could be 
entitled to an indemnity based on additional costs in-
curred for groundwater withdrawal during drought. 
However, given this would not strictly cover a loss of 
crop production, there could be some legal problems 
related to its implementation under current crop insur-
ance legal frameworks. 
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